Several approaches to the product of non-additive monotone measures (or capacities) are discussed and a new approach is proposed. It starts with the M obius product [E. Hendon, H.J. Jacobsen, B. Sloth, T. Tranñs, The product of capacities and belief functions, Mathematical Social Sciences 32 (1996) 95±108] of totally monotone measures and extends it by means of a supremum to general monotone measures. The sup runs over sets of totally monotone measures. These sets are de®ned like the core of monotone measures (or cooperative games). The new product is compatible with the partial order T for arbitrary monotone measures. Ó
Introduction
The Copenhagen group Hendon et al. [3] has shown convincingly that among the dierent approaches for the product of non-additive monotone measures (or capacities) the version using the M obius representation has best properties if one restricts to totally monotone measures. Especially it extends the classical product of additive measures. But in general this product, performed with monotone measures is not monotone any more.
Koshevoy [4] proposes a class of so called triangulation products. First he de®nes the product of f0Y 1g-valued monotone measures as a sup of totally monotone f0Y 1g-valued measures (or unanimity games) and extends this definition by piecewise linearity with respect to a triangulation of the set of normed monotone measures, the wedges being f0Y 1g-valued monotone measures. Constructing a triangulation containing the totally monotone measures as a simplex, he can overcome the above mentioned shortcoming of the M obius product. Another (canonical) one among the triangulation products is the chain product. It is again a monotone measure, but it is not additive if both factors are additive measures.
We propose a variant of the core, the totally monotone core of a set function (or cooperative game) where totally monotone measures (or belief functions) replace the additive ones in the very de®nition. Taking the sup of the products of the respective core elements, we extend the M obius product for totally monotone measures to arbitrary measures. This new product of monotone measures is ± like the triangulation products ± always monotone and the main achievement is that it behaves monotone in both factors.
Compatibility of the product with the partial order T of monotone measures is essential if one is concerned with imprecise probabilities, e.g., for the issue of generalised stochastic independence. Since imprecision of probabilities can be described by a pair of conjugate monotone measures, one would also appreciate to have a product which is compatible with conjugation of monotone measures. With respect to conjugation we get only the partial result (9). Another open question concerns associativity of the product if the factors are not totally monotone or f0Y 1g-valued.
Chain and M obius representation of a monotone measure
For simplicity we suppose that X is a nonvoid ®nite set. Throughout, a (normed) set function m on the power set 2 X is a real valued function m X 2 X 3 0Y 1 with mY 0 and mX 1. A set function m is called a monotone
2-monotonicity is also called supermodularity. Submodularity is the corresponding property with the reversed inequality sign. m is totally monotone or a belief function if it is monotone and k-monotone for any k P 2. The familiar method of representing a real function on a ®nite set as linear combination of indicator functions will be applied to a monotone measure m. We call it the chain representation of m.
There are still simpler f0Y 1g-valued monotone measures than the g above, the`unanimity games' of cooperative game theory. A unanimity game u K for coalition' K P 2 X , K T Y, is the monotone measure de®ned by u K A 1 i A ' K and 0 else. Every f0Y 1g-valued monotone measure g can be written as a maximum (we use the sign ) of unanimity games
g is also a linear combination of unanimity games with integer coecients, which can easily be derived from (2) applying the principle of inclusion exclusion (see [2] ). Combining this result with (1) we get a representation of an arbitrary monotone m as linear combination of unanimity games, the coecient of
Again, this representation is unique since the unanimity games are linearly independent. This is the well known M obius representation of m. Compared to the chain representation, it has the disadvantage that the coecients l m K may assume negative values and the advantage that the f0Y 1g-valued monotone measures used in the representation, the unanimity games, are totally monotone, whereas generally the g i in (1) don't have this property. If the coecients in (3) are all non-negative, l m P 0, then m is totally monotone like the u K , and the converse is also true.
Finally, in this preparatory section, we recall the de®nition of the conjugate m of a set function m, mA X 1 À mX n AX In applications to imprecise probabilities the pair mY m describes the imprecision or uncertainty, especially if m T m. The dierence m À m is called ambiguity or vagueness (see e.g. [2, Section 9]).
The totally monotone core
Combining (1) with (2), it can easily be seen that m is a maximum of linear combinations of unanimity games with positive coecients, hence a maximum of totally monotone measures. This nice property had been the motivation to introduce the following variant of the (additive) core.
First recall the de®nition of the core from cooperative game theory core m X fa j a additive on 2 X Y m T aY aX mXg of a set function m on 2 X . Here we take the dual view and call core m X core m the additive core of m, i.e., core m X fa j a additive on 2 X Y a T mY aX mXgX 
Then bA bK i mK i T mA, which completes the proof. Ã 1 core ( m might also be an interesting solution concept in cooperative game theory. b P core ( m de®nes a distribution l b P 0 of total wealth mX to all coalitions K T Y, not only to singletons like the elements of core m. Notice that with the present notations mK is the maximal value, coalition K (together with its subcoalitions) can get.
As a corollary we get that for any function on X there exists a b X P core ( m with X dm X db X . Here the integral is the Choquet integral. Again, for the additive core the corresponding result holds only if m is submodular.
The Mo Èbius product
Let X 1 and X 2 be ®nite sets and X X X 1 Â X 2 their cartesian product. The problems with the product arise from the fact that 2
This property is stronger as to require that m 1 , m 2 are the marginals of m 1 m 2 . In terms of conditioning, property (5) is related to Bayes' update rule (cf. [1] ). But how to de®ne a product for arbitrary sets in X?
We further require that the product of unanimity games is again a unanimity game. Then (5) implies
Hendon et al. [3] advocate to extend this formula by bilinearity, applied to the M obius representation (3) of the monotone measures m 1 and m 2 ,
where K i runs through all nonempty subsets of X i , i 1Y 2. We will call the product m 1 l m 2 the w oius produt, whence the index l in the notation. The right hand side of (7) simultaneously gives the M obius representation of m 1 l m 2 . Notice that the M obius coecients l m 1 m 2 K of the product are vanishing if u is not a product set K 1 Â K 2 . If one restricts to totally monotone set functions, property (iv) implies that the M obius product is monotone in both factors.
Proof. The proofs are straightforward, only (iv) needs some explanation (this property cannot be found in [3] ). We may assume m 2 u K 2 for some
Since the same equality holds with m 1 , the assertion follows from k 1 T m 1 . Ã Fubini's Theorem, for the Choquet integral, holds in the following sense [2] .
nd equlity holds if m 2 is dditiveF A serious shortcoming of the M obius product is, that monotonicity is not inherited by the product. Thus, it provides a satisfactory product only for totally monotone measures (see (iii)).
For belief functions the M obius product of m 1 , m 2 can be described easily as follows. Regard the M obius transform l mi of m i as an additive measure on the measurable space 2 Xi Y 2 2 X i . Let l X 2 2 X 1 ÂX 2 3 0Y 1 be the usual additive product of l m 1 , l m 2 on the powerset of 2 X 1 Â 2 X 2 , extended trivially to the powerset of 2 X 1 ÂX 2 . Then m 1 l m 2 is the belief function with M obius transform l.
Triangulation products
To circumvent the unpleasant phenomenon of Example 4.1 Koshevoy [4] proposes further products in representing normed monotone measures as convex combinations of f0Y 1g-valued monotone measures. Since these representations are not unique, he ®xes a triangulation of the set of all monotone measures with the f0Y 1g-valued monotone measures as vertices, with respect to which there is a unique representation.
First the product of f0Y 1g-valued monotone measures has to be de®ned. According to (2) and (6) it is natural to set [4] 
where we use the representations (2) g i ji u KiYj i on 2 Xi , i 1Y 2. The product g 1 g 2 is a f0Y 1g-valued monotone measure on 2 X 1 ÂX 2 and it behaves monotone and associative for f0Y 1g-valued monotone measures.
In the situation of Example 4.1 we get as desired g 1 g 2 A 1 i A T Y, i.e., u X 1 u X 2 u X 1 ÂX 2 . In other words, the product (8) of the non-informative pairs u Xi Y u Xi , i 1Y 2, now is the non-informative pair u X Y u X on the product set X X 1 Â X 2 . This result generalises to arbitrary unanimity games,
The easy proof relies on the general formula u K xPK u fxg . Koshevoy constructs triangulations which contain the set of totally monotone measures as a simplex. Given such a triangulation, every monotone measure belongs to exactly one simplex of minimal dimension and can uniquely be represented as a convex combination of the extreme points (i.e., f0Y 1g-valued monotone measures) of that simplex. Then the product (8) is extended by bilinearity like the M obius product above. But now, since only linear combinations with positive coecients are used, the product is always a monotone measure.
There is another interesting triangulation where the vertices of each simplex form a chain of f0Y 1g-valued monotone measures. Since this triangulation is canonical, there is no need to refer explicitly to triangulations for de®ning the corresponding product. The hin produt [2, 4] of monotone measures applies the chain representations m i ki c iYki g iYki Y with distinct g iY1 T Á Á Á T g iYni and all c iYki b 0, i 1Y 2, (see (1)),
Since the c iYki are positive, m 1 j m 2 is a monotone measure, too, and (5) holds. The f0Y 1g-valued monotone measures on the right hand side of (10) are not totally ordered, so this is not the chain representation of the product m 1 j m 2 .
Hence associativity is not obvious like for the M obius product and it is still an open problem. Another shortcoming here is, that for additive monotone m 1 , m 2 it happens that the chain product is not additive.
An alternative product
Here we generalise formula (8) directly. Notice that among the f0Y 1g-valued monotone measures the totally monotone ones are the unanimity games, which appear on the right hand side of that formula. Analogously to (2), monotone measures m i on 2
Xi can be represented as (see (4))
Now we de®ne our new produt,
It inherits the good properties, which the M obius product has for totally monotone measures. Proof. The proofs of (i), (ii), (iv) and (v) are straightforward, but notice that monotonicity of the M obius product ((iv) in Proposition 4.1) plays an important r ole, not only for (iv), but also for (ii). For (iii) with f0Y 1g-valued m i g i we have to show
For the K i on the right hand side u Ki P core ( g i so that P holds in (11). If in Eq. (7) for b 1 l b 2 the product of unanimity games u K 1 u K 2 appears with a coecient T 0Y then g i K i 1, i 1Y 2, so that u K 1 u K 2 appears also on the right hand side of (11). Since the (nonnegative) coecients of (7) sum to 1 we get T in (11). Ã
Conclusion and outlook
We have combined ideas of existing models for the product of monotone measures to construct a product which is again monotone and is compatible with the partial order T in both factors. Also a dual approach is feasible, which, in terms of conditioning, is related to the Dempster-Shafer update rule (cf. [1] ). It starts with the conjugate u K of the unanimity games, represents an arbitrary monotone measure as linear combination of the u K (dual M obius representation), reverses inequalities and replaces the sup with the inf . The resulting dual product equals m 1 m 2 and things would be easy if this equalled m 1 m 2 (in (9) we got this equality only for unanimity games). But 
